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Abstract
The option to choose between several courses of action is often associated with the feeling of being in control. Yet, in
certain situations, one may prefer to decline such agency and instead leave the choice to others. In the present functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we provide evidence that the neural processes involved in decision-making are
modulated not only by who controls our choice options (agency), but also by whether we have a say in who is in control
(context). The fMRI results are noteworthy in that they reveal specific contributions of the anterior frontomedian cortex (viz.
BA 10) and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) in decision-making processes. The RCZ is engaged when conditions clearly
present us with the most choice options. BA 10 is engaged in particular when the choice is completely ours, as well as when
it is completely up to others to choose for us which in turn gives rise to an attribution of control to oneself or someone else,
respectively. After all, it does not only matter whether we have any options to choose from, but also who decides on that.
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Introduction
We employ the term agency to refer to the capacity of human
beings to make choices and to enact those choices in the world. By
the term context, in contrast, we refer to the circumstances under
which agency is assigned in a decision process. That is, in some
situations we might be inclined to give up agency and leave the
choice to others (e.g., out of politeness, or when we are too tired to
choose, or when the consequences of the choice options are
complex or unknown). In other situations, we might be told by
someone else whether or not to take up agency in a decision
process (e.g., when our partner asks us to choose a pattern for the
new bathroom tiles, or when the manager tells us that we will not
have a say in the decision about the new office location). Hence,
the context under which decisions are made can be differentiated
into a free context, where we can choose to take up or decline agency
in the decision process, and a determined context, where it is up to
others to assign agency. Agency in a decision process can in turn
be differentiated into self-agency, where we choose from different
alternatives ourselves, and external agency, where someone else
chooses for us.
The literature on the neural bases of decision-making has
focused largely on the process of choosing per se (i.e., selecting an
appropriate stimulus or action from several alternatives). This
literature documents growing evidence for the crucial role of the
medial frontal cortex (MFC) in choice processes within a
determined context, i.e., when subjects are explicitly told by the
experimenter whether they have a choice or not [1,2]. The neural
bases of the modulatory influences of agency and (especially)
context, which are of central importance to human decision-
making in social situations, remain largely unexplored thus far.
In recent reviews and meta-analyses, it has been proposed that
the MFC can be parcelled into functional divisions associated with
different cognitive processes [3–5]. Specifically, the anterior MFC
(aMFC) has been linked to processes associated with mentalizing,
that is, the ability to understand intentions and goals as entertained
by others [4,6]. This ability is especially important in situations
where another person’s decision influences our own courses of
action and leaves us being under external control. A more
posterior region of the MFC (pMFC) is activated in action
selection and action monitoring [2,3]. Moreover, a portion of the
pMFC, the so-called rostral cingulate zone [RCZ; 7,8], was
identified to be crucially involved in selection processes, that is, in
the selection of response sets [9], and task sets [10]. However, in
these studies, selection processes were investigated in a context in
which the choice options were designated by instructions. The
present fMRI study was designed to provide a novel avenue for
investigating the neural bases of more complex decision-making
situations where the selection processes are modulated by both
agency and context.
Trials in the fMRI experiment consisted of two parts, a first part
where agency for the upcoming decision process was assigned, and
a second part where a task was chosen and executed. In free-context
trials, participants could decide whether they wanted to assume or
decline agency in the subsequent decision process. More
specifically, participants viewed two cue symbols on the screen,
associated with self-agency and external-agency, respectively
(Fig. 1). They could choose between accepting agency (i.e.
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choosing themselves which task to perform on the upcoming
stimulus), or declining agency (i.e. leaving the to-be-performed task
to be designated by instructions). In contrast, in determined-context
trials, participants were told whether they had to perform as agents
or not. This design allows us to address two important questions: (i)
is the RCZ differentially engaged in self-agency decision-making,
where the participants can choose a task themselves, compared to
external-agency decision-making, where the experimenter deter-
mines the task; and (ii) is the aMFC differentially engaged in
decision-making processes in free-context trials, where the
participants can choose between self-agency and external-agency,
compared to determined-context trials, where the experimenter
decides about agency?
Results and Discussion
To answer these questions, we computed a random-effects
analysis of the fMRI data to test for the main effects of agency
(self-agency vs. external-agency), context (free vs. determined), and
their interaction. These analyses were computed with respect to two
different onsets within the same trial, that were separated by a long
and variable interval (mean duration= 4750 ms). The first onset was
set to the presentation of the ‘agency cues’ (Fig. 1) at the beginning of
each trial. The second onset was set to the ‘task cues’ where
participants could choose between two or three tasks or had no
choice (see Fig. 1). Thus, if participants decided themselves (self-
agency on free-context trials) or were asked by the experimenter (self-
agency on determined-context trials) to choose, then they had two or
three degrees of freedom in task choice. When they decided or were
told to leave the choice to the experimenter (external-agency on free-
context trials, and determined-context trials, respectively), they had
no freedom in task choice.
The whole brain analysis of the fMRI data revealed that the
agency cue and the task cue elicited distinct patterns of activation.
First, for the agency cue onset, significant activations were
obtained for the interaction between context and agency (see
Fig. 2A) in the aMFC (identified as Brodmann Area (BA) 10
extending into BA 9). The main contrasts for agency (self-agency
vs. external-agency) and context (free context vs. determined
context) did reveal no significantly stronger activations for self-
agency and free context.
Figure 1. Paradigm. Schematic drawing of the trial sequence for free-context and determined-context trials. ‘Agency cues’ could either be circles
(self-agency: participants choose the task themselves) or diamonds (external-agency: the task is chosen by the experimenter). In free-context trials,
participants could choose to accept agency (by pressing the response button that was aligned to the circle cue in a spatially compatible mapping) or
to decline agency (by pressing the response button aligned with the diamond cue). In determined-context trials, participants were either informed
that agency was theirs (both agency cues were circles) or that agency was not theirs (both cues were diamonds). Agency cues were presented for
2000 ms and were followed by a variable interval of 4000–5500 ms. Subsequently, ‘tasks cues’ were presented in the 262 grid with German
abbreviations ‘FAR’ (color), ‘SPI’ (orientation), ‘GRO¨’ (size), and ‘LIN’ (line). Quadrants with bold lines indicated that a task was available for choice
(varied between 1–3 degrees of freedom). Target and probe stimulus were presented until a response was given or an interval of 2000 ms was
exceeded. Finally, feedback was presented for 500 ms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001899.g001
Figure 2. Activation maps averaged over 21 subjects mapped
onto an individual brain. Red labels indicate positive z values.
Coordinates are given in Talairach space. Error bars reflect standard
errors. A) Activation elicited by the agency cues: Cross-over interaction
between agency and context. Note that we also obtained a significant
cross-over interaction in the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus (7,
25, 12). The activation in BA 10 comprised 107 contiguous voxels; the
activation in the Thalamus comprised 103 contiguous voxels. B)
Activation elicited by the task cues: Region of interest analysis in the
rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) showing the main effect of agency (self-
agency.external agency) only in free-context trials. The activation in
the RCZ comprised 91 contiguous voxel.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001899.g002
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Interestingly, statistics on the percent signal changes revealed a
cross-over interaction (F(2,19) = 20.54, p,.001), with free-con-
text/self-agency and determined-context/external-agency eliciting
greater BA 10 activation than free-context/external-agency and
determined-context/self-agency, respectively (t(20).2.46, p,.05).
This pattern replicates and extends the recent finding that this
aMFC region is active in a determined context during externally
guided (determined-context/external-agency) but not internally
guided (determined-context/self-agency) action selection [9]. BA
10 has been implicated both in processing information about the
self and in understanding the minds of others. More specifically, it
is engaged consistently during a variety of self-referential tasks that
require reporting one’s own internal states, including adopting a
first-person perspective [for a review see 11] as well as in processes
related to perspective-taking and mentalizing [for a review see, e.g.
4]. More specifically, it has been proposed that this cortical region
is involved in attending to ones own decision processes as well as in
mentalizing about the decisions of similar others [11,12]. The free-
context/self-agency condition refers to choices made by oneself,
whereas the determined-context/external-agency condition refers
to choices determined by someone else. The crucial feature of
these conditions is that there is a fit between the degrees of
freedom in context and agency: Voluntarily deciding about agency
might thereby give rise to a coherent attribution of control to
oneself whereas having no say about agency is in line with a
coherent attribution of control to someone else. The free-context/
external-agency and determined-context/self-agency conditions
are more ambivalent because either one decides to leave agency to
others, or self-agency is imposed by others. Hence, these two
conditions do not refer to a clear self/other perspective.
Second, for the task cue onset, the whole brain analysis of
agency (self-agency vs. external-agency) revealed activation in the
RCZ (see Fig. 2B). This activation site closely resembles the area
active when participants voluntarily select between different task
or response sets [9,10]. Moreover, a subsequently performed
region of interest (ROI) analysis confirms our prediction that
context modulates the more basic decision-making processes: If
participants decided to choose between different task sets (free
context), then the RCZ was activated differentially for self-agency
as compared to external-agency conditions, t(20) = 2.97, p= .007
(see Fig. 2B). Significantly higher percent signal changes were also
obtained for the self-agency condition for the free compared to the
determined context t(20) = 2.8, p = .01. In contrast, RCZ activa-
tion did not differ between self- and external-agency conditions in
the determined context, t(20) = 0.24, p = .81. The interaction
between agency and context nearly reached significance
(F(2,19) = 3.8, p,.06). Finally, the activation did not differ
between the DF3 and DF2 condition.
In a previous study [10], RCZ activation was more pronounced
in self-compared to external-agency conditions. In that study, the
self-agency condition was the condition that provided maximum
freedom of choice. In the present study, maximum freedom of
choice was obtained in self-agency conditions in free-context trials.
Thus, while the RCZ was found activated in a determined context
also (see Fig. 2B), the self-agency condition in free context trials
offered the most degrees of freedom in choice and hence revealed
the highest RCZ activation. We therefore argue that activation in
the RCZ is modulated by both, context and agency.
In a final analysis, we aimed to show that the aMFC and the RCZ
reveal distinct roles in decision-making. Hence, we computed two
three-way interactions separately for both onsets for agency, context,
and ROI. Please note that the percent signal changes from the
aMFC and RCZ were derived from neutral contrasts (see
Supplementary Materials S1). The analysis revealed a significant
agency6context6ROI interaction for the first onset, (F(2,19) = 5.14,
p,.05), and a marginally significant agency6context6ROI inter-
action for the second onset (F(2,19) = 3.85, p= .06). For the first
onset, the aMFC revealed again a significant crossing-over
interaction for agency and context (F(2,19) = 14.32, p= .001), which
was not apparent in the RCZ. Moreover, for the second onset, the
RCZ was relatively stronger activated for the self-agency compared
to the external-agency conditions in the free context (t(20) = 1.86,
p= .07), but not in the determined context (t(20) = 1.05, p= .36). An
opposite pattern was found for the aMFC, where relatively stronger
activation was revealed for the external-agency conditions compared
to the self-agency condition in the free context (t(20) = 2.62, p= .01),
but not in the determined context (t(20) = .16, p= .87). However,
computing two-way interactions for the RCZ and aMFC for the
second onset did not yield significant results (F,1).
In conclusion, the present results provide evidence for the vital
roles of context and agency in modulating decision-making
processes. The findings are noteworthy in that they reveal specific
contributions of the aMFC (viz. BA 10) and the RCZ in decision-
making processes. The RCZ is engaged when conditions clearly
present us with the most choice options. The BA 10 is engaged in
particular when the choice is completely ours, as well as when it is
completely up to others to choose for us. After all, it does not only
matter whether we have any options to choose from, but also who
decides on that.
Materials and Methods
Participants
21 healthy volunteers were recruited. We obtained written
consent from all 21 participants, 12 females and 9 males (age:
mean=26.05, SD=2.35), prior to the scanning session. All
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No subject
had a history of neurological, major medical, or psychiatric
disorder. All participants were right handed as assessed by the
Edinburgh Inventory [13].
Behavioral Task
The design consisted of two independent variables, ‘context’
(free-context trials vs. determined-context trials) and ‘agency’ (self-
agency vs. external-agency). Moreover, the degrees of freedom in
choice in the self-agency condition varied between 2 and 3 (DF2
and DF3). The ‘agency cues’ could either be circles or diamonds,
associated with either ‘self-agency’ or ‘external-agency’ respective-
ly (see Fig. 1). At the beginning of each trial, two circles or two
diamonds (both conditions referring to a determined-context trial)
or the circle together with the diamond (referring to a free-context
trial) were presented for 2000 ms. In the condition with two
different cues, the presentation side of the cues was counterbal-
anced within subjects. In both free-context and determined-
context trials, participants were required to give a response with
the index or middle finger of the right hand. For the determined-
context trials, the response button press had no consequence
compared to the free-context trials where participants indicated
with a spatially compatible mapping whether they accepted or
declined agency in the secondary task. Note that participants had
to select a specific response button in all conditions so that mere
response selection processes could not account for the differential
activation between free-context and determined-context trials.
After a variable delay of a mean duration of 4750 ms, four cues
each associated with one of four simple discrimination tasks, i.e.
color, orientation, size, and line task, were presented [10]. The
cues were foveally presented in a 262 grid with a visual angle of
2.8u (Fig. 1). Each quadrant of the grid contained a semantic
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abbreviation for one of the four tasks, i.e. ‘FAR’ for ‘Farbe’ which
corresponds to color, ‘SPI’ for ‘Spitze’ which corresponds to
orientation, ‘GRO¨’ for ‘Groesse’ which corresponds to size, and
‘LIN’ for ‘Linie’ which corresponds to line. The locations of the
cues were balanced across participants. There were 16 possible
‘cue-location mappings’ which were randomly assigned to the
participants. In order to instruct the participants which task could
be chosen, the quadrants where either bold, indicating that this
task could be chosen, or not, indicating that this task was not
available for choice. After a constant interval the target (a triangle)
was presented. This target was multivalent, i.e. the target
contained one value of each discrimination task (i.e. one out of
two colors, one out of two orientations, one out of two sizes and
one out of two line types) resulting in 16 possible values of a target.
Corresponding to their choice of task, participants had to respond
to the target with either the index or middle finger of the right
hand. In order to check for accuracy and to give valid feedback,
the four semantic abbreviations of the four tasks were presented
again. This time, they were horizontally aligned while the
locations of the semantic cues were pseudo-randomized, assuring
that participants could not prepare for this response during the
second decision time. At this point, participants were required to
indicate which task they had actually chosen and responded to
with their first response by pressing the spatially compatible key
with the fingers of their left hand. Finally, a feedback for wrong,
missed, or correct responses was presented.
We also included 24 catch trials to make sure that participants
engaged in the selection of agency at the presentation of the
agency cues. These trials were highly comparable to the
experimental trials. The only difference pertained to the
presentation of match cues instead of the target and probe stimuli.
The match cues consisted of 2 words, ‘stimmt’ (i.e. match) or
‘stimmt nicht’ (i.e. no match) which were presented next to each
other in the middle of the screen. The presentation side of the
match cues was pseudo-randomized. Participants had to indicate
with their right index or middle finger with a spatially compatible
mapping whether the agency option (i.e., self-agency vs. external-
agency) presented at the beginning of a trial matched the degrees
of freedom of tasks presented in the 262 grid. There were 6
different conditions for the factors context, agency and match
which were all counterbalanced within subjects. Finally, also 10
null events were included, which were pseudo-randomly inter-
spersed. The null events were introduced to compensate for the
overlap of the blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
response between adjacent trials.
Trial timing
The timing of the sequence of trials was triggered from the
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) control every 18 seconds. The
trials started with a variable oversampling interval of 0, 500, 1000
or 1500 ms to obtain an interpolated temporal resolution of
500 ms. Then, a fixation cross was presented for 500 ms followed
by the agency cues which were presented for 2000 ms. After the
presentation of the agency cues, a variable delay of 4000–5500 ms
with a variable oversampling interval of 0, 500, 1000 or 1500 ms
was presented. Subsequently, the 262 grid appeared for 2000 ms.
Then the target was presented until a response was made with the
right hand or until the response interval exceeded 2000 ms. After
the first response was given, the probe stimulus was presented. It
remained on the screen until the second response was made with
the left hand or until the response interval exceeded 2000 ms.
Finally, valid feedback was presented for 500 ms.
The experiment lasted for about 60 min and consisted of one
block starting out with two dummy trials which were excluded
from further analysis. In total, 100 experimental trials (without
catch trials and null-events) were presented, resulting in 25 trials
for each the determined self-agency and determined external-
agency condition and 25.75 trials for the free self-agency and
23.66 trials for the free external-agency condition. Even though it
was not possible to control for the frequencies of self-agency or
external-agency in the free-context trials, we pre-selected partic-
ipants who chose both options approximately equally frequent (see
also section ‘pre-selection of participants’). A comparable con-
straint applied to the presentation of the degrees of freedom (DF2
and DF3) in the self-agency condition. There were 14 different
combinations of DF and the four discrimination tasks (DF1= 4
combinations; DF2=6 combinations; DF3= 4 combinations).
Again, these could not be introduced in a pre-randomized task
sequence due to the manipulation of self-agency. Therefore,
subsets of each combination of DF and tasks were defined. Trials
were pseudo-randomly chosen from each subset, thereby assuring
that each combination was presented with approximately equal
frequency. Furthermore, it is important to note that the trial
following the DF3 condition was not constrained to the one task
which was not valid for choice before.
Pre-selection of participants
Before participants entered the scanner they underwent a training
session of 30 min in which they were familiarized with the task. On
average this training session took place 2 days before the scanning
session. In the training session and also before the scanning
procedure the participants were instructed to engage in every trial
and consciously think about their choice on each trial. Please note
that participants were not instructed to counterbalance between
conditions or were otherwise biased to perform a specific selection
strategy. Therefore, the training session was included to select only
those participants who assumed and declined agency approximately
equally often in the free-context trials and also showed no bias in
selecting a specific response button towards the agency cues (see
Supplementary Materials S1). Finally, 21 out of 28 participants
taking part in the training session were included in the fMRI study.
Magnetic resonance imaging scanning procedure
The experiment was carried out on a 3T scanner (Medspec 30/
100, Bruker, Ettlingen, Germany). 20 axial slices were acquired
(19.2 cm field of view, 64664 matrix, 4 mm thickness, 1 mm
spacing) parallel to the AC-PC plane and covering the whole
brain. Slice gaps were interpolated to generate output data with a
spatial resolution of 36363 mm. We used a single shot, gradient
recalled echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition time
2000 ms, echo time 30 ms, 90u flip-angle). Prior to the functional
runs, correspondingly 20 anatomical MDEFT slices and 20 EPI-
T1 slices were acquired. Stimuli were displayed using a head-
mounted mirror-system.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging analysis
Analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data
was performed using the inhouse LIPSIA software [14]. First,
functional data were corrected for movement artifacts. The
temporal offset between the slices acquired in one scan was then
corrected using a sinc interpolation algorithm. Data were filtered
using a spatial Gaussian filter with sigma= 0.8 (this refers to a
FWHM=5.65 mm). A temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff
frequency of 1/160 Hz was used for baseline correction of the
signal. All functional data sets were individually registered into
three-dimensional (3D) space using the participants` individual
high-resolution anatomical images. This 3D reference data set was
acquired for each participant during a previous scanning session.
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The two-dimensional anatomical MDEFT slices, geometrically
aligned with the functional slices, were used to compute a
transformation matrix containing rotational and translational
parameters that register the anatomical slices with the 3D
reference T1 data set. These transformation matrices were
normalised to the standard Talairach brain size [15] by linear
scaling and finally applied to the functional data. The statistical
evaluation was performed using the general linear model for
serially autocorrelated observations [16]. The design matrix was
generated with a synthetic hemodynamic response function [17]
and its first derivative. The onsets for the event-related analysis
were set to the presentation of the agency cues at the beginning of
each trial and to the 262 grid. The model equation was convolved
with a Gaussian kernel with a dispersion of 4 sec full width at half
maximum. Contrast maps were generated for each participant.
After the individual functional datasets were all aligned to the
same stereotactic reference space, a group analysis was performed.
A one-sample t test of contrast maps across participants (random-
effects model) was computed to ascertain whether observed
differences between conditions were significantly different from
zero. Subsequently, t values were transformed into z-scores. To
correct for false-positive results, in a first step, an initial voxelwise
z-threshold was set to Z= 2.58 (p= 0.005, uncorrected) for the
agency6context interaction contrast (100 trials) and to Z= 2.33
(p = 0.01, uncorrected) for the conditional main effect of agency in
the free context (50 trials). In a second step, the results were
corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster-size and cluster-
value thresholds obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations using a
significance level of p = 0.05. To ensure that the reported
activations, namely the MFC and RCZ, are significantly activated
at p,.05 (corrected at the cluster-level), a cluster-size of 1620 mm3
(60 contiguous 36363 mm voxels) for the interaction between
agency6context and a cluster-size of 2439 mm3 (90 contiguous
voxels) for the conditional main effect of agency in the free context
was required. In total we could ensure, that the reported
activations we focus our discussion on, namely the aMFC and
the RCZ, are significantly activated at p,.05, corrected for
multiple comparisons at the cluster-level.
To compute the percent signal change of the hemodynamic
response in the aMFC, all significantly activated voxels exceeding the
critical threshold in the group-averaged whole-brain interaction
between context6agency and belonging to a contiguous cluster in
the aMFC were included. Analogously, we also computed the
percent signal change of the hemodynamic response in the RCZ
including all significantly activated voxels that exceeded the critical
threshold in the group-averaged main effect of agency and belonged
to a contiguous cluster in the RCZ. We then extracted the time
course of the signal underlying these activated voxels for each
participant from the preprocessed data. The percent signal change
was calculated in relation to the mean signal intensity across all
timesteps for these voxels. The signal change was averaged for each
condition for 16 seconds beginning with the presentation of the
agency cues and the presentation of the 262 grid, respectively. We
then subtracted the time course of the null event from the time
course of the relevant conditions to compensate for the overlap of the
BOLD response [18]. The logic is that null events are (at least on
average) embedded within the same past and future trial conditions
as a regular event, and thus have the same preceding and succeeding
average BOLD signal. By subtracting the null event from the
relevant condition, one assumes that the brain area, i.e. activated
voxels, exhibit no activation for the null event so that the remaining
BOLD signal is solely due to the experimental manipulation. We
searched for the largest value of the signal in the time window
between 4 to 8 seconds after the presentation of the agency cues and
the 262 grid, respectively. Finally, these values were averaged across
participants.
To test whether the aMFC and the RCZ reveal distinct
functional roles in decision-making processes, additional region of
interest (ROI) analyses with unbiased ROIs were conducted. In a
first step, neutral contrasts, i.e. all conditions vs. resting baseline,
were computed separately for both onsets. Based on these
contrasts, in a second step, ROIs were generated for the aMFC
[3] and the RCZ [2,7]. The ROI for the aMFC was generated
from the neutral contrast, i.e. all conditions vs. resting baseline, for
the first onset, and defined as a sphere with 3 mm radius centered
on the peak voxel of the activation (see Supplementary Materials
S1). The same procedure was applied to generate the ROI in the
RCZ. Here the neutral contrast, i.e. all conditions vs. resting
baseline, for the second onset was taken, and the ROI was
centered at the peak voxel of the activation, with a sphere radius of
3 mm (see Supplementary Materials S1). In a third step, the
percent signal change from each ROI, i.e. aMFC and RCZ, was
extracted separately for each subject, for each condition, and for
each onset. Finally, these values were subjected to repeated
measures ANOVAs to statistically test for three-way interactions
between agency, context, and ROI, separately for the first and
second onset.
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